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I.

Introduction
This brief is in reply to the arguments made by Claimant related to Defendants' cross-

appeal of the Industrial Commission's denial of their Motion to Strike Claimant's Post-Hearing
Reply Brief and the questions raised regarding the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction, or lack
thereof, related to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association and the ability to award attorney
fees under the provisions of the Guaranty Association Act. Claimant relies upon a subsequent
decision by the Industrial Commission in Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank Northwest, et. aL, I.C.
1999-031588, as a basis for her arguments in response. However, Claimant fails to inform the
Court that the decision itself is also the subject of a similar appeal, which again asks this Court to
consider the extent and scope of the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction over the Guaranty
Association. Defendants continue to contend that should the Court in the present matter reverse
the factual findings and remand the case for further proceedings, that the extent of those
proceedings would be limited solely to the areas expressly defined by statute for the
Commission.
Claimant raises what are best called "policy arguments" in favor of their interpretation of
the Commissions Judicial Rules of Practice as they relate to post-hearing briefing and suggest
that a claimant should be given the unfair advantage of extensive briefing when compared to that
available to a defendant.

She has propounded no persuasive case law to establish that a

defendant in a worker's compensation case should be constrained to respond to arguments raised
and present their own case in less pages than those available to claimant. The Rules, of which
the comments are a part, define the proper parameters for the fair resolution of issues brought
before the Commission.
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As such, Defendants respectfully request that in the alternative that the Court reverses the
Industrial Commission as requested by Claimant, that it issue an opinion instructive on the issues
raised in cross-appeal.

II.

The Industrial Commission erred by denying Defendants' Motion to Strike
Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief.
Contrary to Claimant's arguments, Defendants have demonstrated that the Industrial

Commission failed to adhere to its own procedural rules and guidelines when it refused to grant
the Motion to Strike. Only recently has there arisen confusion about the page limits contained in
Judicial Rule of Procedure II(A) and its subsequent Comment. The claimants' bar has pounced
upon the argument that the Rule should be read to give them an edge in post-hearing briefing,
suggesting that they should be given double the number of pages available to present their
arguments. In the past, it was common practice for claimants' counsel to submit an opening
brief that was 20 to 25 pages long, reserving 5 to 10 pages for rebuttal in the responsive brief.
Defendants' counsel have always known that they were limited solely to thirty pages, forcing
them to address the arguments raised in the initial brief and attempt counter any arguments that
may be raised in the short reply. Now, to adopt the approach that Claimant's counsel has
recommended, defendants would face the insurmountable task of responding to sixty pages of
arguments in half the space. It is impossible to see how such an interpretation of the J.R.P. could
be considered fair and practical.
As with her later arguments, Claimant relies upon a recent decision of the Industrial
Commission in the case of Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank Northwest, et. aL, I.C. 1999-031588,
as the basis for the argument that the motion was properly denied. As mentioned above, one of
the issues presently on appeal in Griffith is the page limit discrepancy. Claimant focuses upon
the use of the word "briefing" in the comment to J.R.P. l1(A) and contends that it has both a
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plural and singular meaning, and that fairness dictates that it should be interpreted to only in the
singular, allowing each brief submitted to be thirty pages long. Claimant then goes on to argue,
that to find otheIWise, would allow a claimant to " ... put nothing in its initial brief, leaving the
Defendant with nothing to "reply" to," implying that the claimant could then swoop in with a
subsequent response that covers the issues at hearing. Unfortunately, Claimant's logic is flawed
in that it ignores the requirements of due process and judicial procedure mandating that all issues
to be tried be addressed in the opening brief. This Court was clear in holding that under Idaho
case law issues addressed by an administrative tribunal must be presented such that new issues
cannot be raised without first serving an affected party with fair notice and providing a full
opportunity to meet the issue. See, White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Id 784, 786, 527 P. 2d 887
(1977). A claimant submitting a brief with nothing to reply to runs the risk of waiving the ability
to respond.
The truly prejudicial effect of the Industrial Commission's decision in the present matter
is evidenced by the briefing by Claimant on appeal. The majority of issues raised by Claimant
on appeal appeared in her "reply" brief and subsequent briefing on reconsideration. The fact that
these issues were not raised in the initial briefing is interesting and important with respect to the
waiver argument. If the Industrial Commission had properly struck Claimant's reply brief at the
outset, we would most likely not be before the Court today.

Fortunately, the Commission

properly addressed the factual issues before it and found in Defendants' favor. As before, the
unambiguous language and comment of l.R.P. 11 imposes a thirty (30) post-hearing briefing
page limit and as a matter of due process Defendants are entitled to the benefit of such
procedural protection. See generally, Madrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767,40 P.3d 125 (2002).
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III.

The Industrial Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act.
With respect to Claimant's arguments that the Industrial Commission does have subject

matter jurisdiction over the actions to be taken by the Idaho Guaranty Association, Claimant
again turns to the recent decision of Marlene Griffith v. Firstbank Northwest, et. aL, supra. She
focuses heavily upon the Commission's assertion that the defendants in Griffith must pay in full
all claims made against them in that matter. The author(s) of Griffith attempt to interpret the
scope if the Insurance Guaranty Act, as it relates to worker's compensation law, to justify the
intended result. Unfortunately, for the same reasons that Griffith is on appeal, the Commission
has overstepped its bounds and entered into an area not within their statutory powers and
authority.
Defendants acknowledge that Idaho Code § 41-3605(7) defines what is a "covered claim"
under the Act; however, that language alone does not extend to the Industrial Commission the
power to enforce an order against the Association for payment of a worker's compensation
judgment. Defendants contend that the Industrial Commission has the authority to determine the
amount of liability that could have been assessed against the defunct surety had it not come
under the auspices of the Guaranty Act. To the contrary, the further provisions of the Guaranty
Act then serve to govern how much, if any, of the liability assessed is to be paid.
That difference alone between the Idaho version of the Act and that of Minnesota does
not serve to invalidate the arguments previously raised.

Although Defendants understand

Claimant's interest in seeing the Guaranty Association treated in the same light as the now
defunct surety, that is not the reason behind the creation of this statutorily created body. As
previously argued, the Association is not to be treated as the last resort if other sources of
compensation exist to reimburse a claimant.
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Claimant suggests that the record is devoid of any proof that Claimant's bills could be or
were being covered by a third-party insurer, although she acknowledges that she was receiving
Social Security disability and Medicaid benefits.

To the contrary, Defendants assert that

Claimant failed to present any outstanding medical expenses into evidence that had not been paid
or reimbursed by third-party sources. Claimant bears the burden of proof to establish the amount
of any unpaid or outstanding medical expenses, not Defendants. Claimant's Social Security file,
which is quite voluminous, was presented as a hearing exhibit and is before the Court on appeal.
Notwithstanding the above, the Idaho Guaranty Association Act implicitly sets forth the
statutory framework for the administration of claims, including what aspects of each claim
should be given deference or priority over others. Without the Act, claimants would be faced
with the untenable position of trying to recover benefits through the complicated bankruptcy
process.
Claimant next refers the Court to the Commission's finding in Griffith that the medical
expenses at issue in that case were "typically excluded from private health policies," suggesting
that the expenses existing in the present matter may also be similarly situated. Unfortunately,
this is going to be a major issue before the Court in the Griffith appeal for the Defendants. There
is no evidence in the record below in Griffith that this was expressly the case with Ms. Griffith's
third-party insurer(s). The Commission's assumptions are just that, and not based upon any
evidence.

The speculative nature of this type of conclusion is but one example as to why

Griffith is being appealed. Turning to the matter at hand, Claimant presented no evidence at

hearing or on reconsideration that there was any "exclusion" relevant to her argument.
Defendants seek the protection from this Court from conflicting interpretations of the Act
from the State's administrative agencies. The Act itself contains a straight-forward process for
submitting a claim and appealing any decision by the Guaranty Association. Defendants merely
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request that the Court acknowledge the confines and strictures of the Guarantee Act and direct
the Commission to structure its decisions accordingly.

IV.

If the Industrial Commission does have subject matter jurisdiction, it should be

directed to comport with the appropriate provisions of Idaho Insurance Guaranty
Association Act.
Claimant's reliance again upon the Griffith decision with respect to Defendants'
arguments about the ability, or lack thereof, for the Commission to award attorneys fees against
the Guaranty Association is misplaced. Notwithstanding the fact that Griffith is also on appeal,
the underlying reasoning of the Commission in Griffith for finding to the contrary is also
misguided. In Griffith, the Commission referred to an outdated case for the definition of the
terms "damages," "punitive damages" or "exemplary damages." The Commission, and Claimant
in the present matter, suggest that the discussion of the reasoning behind an award of attorney
fees in the case of Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 98, 15 P.3d 329, 333 (2000)
should be similarly applied in the present matter. However, this line of argument ignores the fact
that the decision in Dennis, although issued in the year 2000, is based upon reasoning originating
in 1969.
This Court puts forth the proposition in Dennis that attorneys fees in worker's
compensation cases matters should be deemed compensation to the injured employee instead of a
penalty, which stems from the prior decision of Mayo v. SafewayStores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161,457
P.2d 400 (1969). Unfortunately, Mayo was decided prior to the adoption of the provisions in the
Idaho Insurance Guarantee Association Act. The facts in Dennis did not involve a defunct
surety or otherwise raise any questions germane to the current appeal. Therefore, the Court has
never had the opportunity to address the relationship ofI.C. § 41-3605(7) as it relates to I.C. §72804.

RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF- 9

This Court has previously noted that "Worker's compensation statutes must be considered
in the context of the entire act." Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 909, 980
P.2d 566 (1999) (internal citations omitted). In the same context, the availability, or lack thereof,
to issue an award of attorney fees and costs in the present matter should be considered in the
context of the Insurance Guaranty Association Act, which governs the party against whom fees
are sought. The actions for which fees are sought in the underlying case relate to a decision
made by the now defunct surety, not the Guaranty Association. Claimant presented no evidence
or facts at hearing to justify why an award was warranted against the present Defendants.

V.

Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Claimant has failed to present any foundation to establish why she would be entitled to an

award of attorneys fees on appeal. For the reasons set forth in Defendants' opening brief and
addressed above, it is questionable whether Claimant would even be entitled to an award of fees
or costs under I.e. § 41-3605(7). The issues raised on cross-appeal are issues of first impression
and do not warrant a finding that they were brought frivolously or without grounds. Claimant's
reliance upon the decision in Griffith as a basis for fees in the present matter is unjustified.

Griffith involves a separate set of facts and evidence, none of which is properly before the Court
in this matter and should be used as the basis of any decision in that regard.

VI.

Conclusion.
For the above and foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that in the

alternative the Court reverses and remands the Industrial Commission's final decision of the
underlying matter, that it reverse the Commission's ruling on Defendants' Motion to Strike and
that it address the issues raised with respect to the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction as it
relates to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of June, 2010.
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP

CERTIFICAT~F

'1 ~

SERVICE

day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS '/CROSS-APPELLANTS , BRIEF by delivering the
same to each of the following attorneys of record, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
follows:
R. Brad Masingill
P.O. Box 467
Weiser, Idaho 83672
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